Fiscal illusion and political accountability theory and evidence from two local tax regimes in Britain Norman Gemmell, Oliver Morrissey, Abuzer Pinar
By: Gemmell, Norman
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Contributor(s): Morrissey, Oliver | Pinar, Abuzer.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2002Subject(s): REINO UNIDO | RENTA | IMPUESTOS LOCALES | REFORMA | ELUSION FISCAL
In:
Public Choice, v.110, n. 3 y 4, march 2002 p. 199-224
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEF | OP 1443/2002/110/3/4-1 (Browse shelf) | Available |
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| OP 1443/2001/108/3/4 Bribing votes | OP 1443/2001/109/1/2 Growth and the welfare state in the EU | OP 1443/2001/109/3/4 The political economy of fiscal policies | OP 1443/2002/110/3/4-1 Fiscal illusion and political accountability | OP 1443/2002/110/3/4-2 Aggregating spending preferences | OP 1443/2002/110/3/4-3 Political budget cycles | OP 1443/2002/111/1/2 Political cycles, fiscal deficits, and output spillovers in Europe |
Resumen.--Notas.--Conclusiones.--Bibliografia
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