Normal view MARC view ISBD view

Are powerful majorities inefficient for parties and efficient for taxpayers ? an analysis of budget maximization in the United States David T. Mitchell, Danny R. Hughes and Noel D. Campbell

Material type: Article

ArticlePublisher: 2014Subject(s): PRESUPUESTOS

In: Public Finance Review v. 42, n. 1, December 2014, p. 117-138

Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.

average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

Item type	Current location	Home library	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode
		IEF	OP 581/2014/1-3 (Browse shelf)	Available		OP 581/2014/1-3

Previous	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	Next
Previous	OP 581/2013/6-7 The redistributive potential of transfer taxation	OP 581/2014/1-1 State fiscal rules and composition changes in public spending before theelection	OP 581/2014/1-2 Reevaluating the effect of tax and expenditure limitations	OP 581/2014/1-3 Are powerful majorities inefficient for parties and efficient for taxpayers ?	OP 581/2014/2-1 Do workers profit from the nonprofit tax exemption ?	OP 581/2014/2-2 Environmental fiscal reform and fiscal consolidation	OP 581/2014/2-3 Mixed taxation and transboundary externalities	Next

Disponible también en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía.

There are no comments for this item.

Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales