Central Bank credibility and fiscal responsibility Jesse Schreger, Pierre Yared and Emilio Zaratiegui
By: Schreger, Jesse
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Contributor(s): Yared, Pierre | Zaratiegui, Emilio.
Material type: 
ArticleSubject(s): BANCOS CENTRALES | POLITICA MONETARIA | DEUDA PUBLICA | ECONOMIA KEYNESIANA | INFLACION
In:
The American Economic Review v. 6, n. 3, September 2024, p. 377-394.Summary: We consider a New Keynesian model with strategic monetary and fiscal interactions. The fiscal authority maximizes social welfare. Monetary policy is delegated to a central bank with an anti-inflation bias that suffers from a lack of commitment. The impact of central bank hawkishness on debt issuance is nonmonotonic because increased hawkishness reduces the benefit from fiscal stimulus while simultaneously increasing real debt capacity. Starting from high levels of hawkishness (dovishness), a marginal increase in the central bank's anti-inflation bias decreases (increases) debt issuance.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 2145/2024/3-2 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 2145/2024/3-2 |
Bibliografía.
We consider a New Keynesian model with strategic monetary and fiscal interactions. The fiscal authority maximizes social welfare. Monetary policy is delegated to a central bank with an anti-inflation bias that suffers from a lack of commitment. The impact of central bank hawkishness on debt issuance is nonmonotonic because increased hawkishness reduces the benefit from fiscal stimulus while simultaneously increasing real debt capacity. Starting from high levels of hawkishness (dovishness), a marginal increase in the central bank's anti-inflation bias decreases (increases) debt issuance.
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