Unemployment insurance taxes and labor demand quasi-experimental evidence from administrative data by Andrew C. Johnston
By: Johnston, Andrew
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2021Subject(s): SEGURO DE DESEMPLEO | FINANCIACION | SOCIEDADES | IMPUESTOS | INCREMENTO | IMPOSICION OPTIMA
In:
American Economic Journal : Economic Policy v. 13, n. 1, February 2021, p. 266-293Summary: To finance unemployment insurance, states raise payroll tax rates on employers who engage in layoffs. Tax rates are, therefore, highest for firms after downturns, potentially hampering labor-market recovery. Using full-population, administrative records from Florida, I estimate the effect of these tax increases on firm behavior leveraging a regression kink design in the tax schedule. Tax hikes reduce hiring and employment substantially, with no effect on layoffs or wages. The results imply unanticipated costs of the financing regime which reduce the optimal benefit by a quarter and account for 12 percent of the unemployment in the wake of the Great Recession.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 2135/2021/1-1 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 2135/2021/1-1 |
Resumen.
To finance unemployment insurance, states raise payroll tax rates on employers who engage in layoffs. Tax rates are, therefore, highest for firms after downturns, potentially hampering labor-market recovery. Using full-population, administrative records from Florida, I estimate the effect of these tax increases on firm behavior leveraging a regression kink design in the tax schedule. Tax hikes reduce hiring and employment substantially, with no effect on layoffs or wages. The results imply unanticipated costs of the financing regime which reduce the optimal benefit by a quarter and account for 12 percent of the unemployment in the wake of the Great Recession.
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