Johnston, Andrew
Unemployment insurance taxes and labor demand quasi-experimental evidence from administrative data / by Andrew C. Johnston .-- , 2021
Resumen.
To finance unemployment insurance, states raise payroll tax rates on employers who engage in layoffs. Tax rates are, therefore, highest for firms after downturns, potentially hampering labor-market recovery. Using full-population, administrative records from Florida, I estimate the effect of these tax increases on firm behavior leveraging a regression kink design in the tax schedule. Tax hikes reduce hiring and employment substantially, with no effect on layoffs or wages. The results imply unanticipated costs of the financing regime which reduce the optimal benefit by a quarter and account for 12 percent of the unemployment in the wake of the Great Recession.
SEGURO DE DESEMPLEO
FINANCIACION
SOCIEDADES
IMPUESTOS
INCREMENTO
IMPOSICION OPTIMA
American Economic Journal : Economic Policy 1945-7731v. 13, n. 1, February 2021, p. 266-293
Unemployment insurance taxes and labor demand quasi-experimental evidence from administrative data / by Andrew C. Johnston .-- , 2021
Resumen.
To finance unemployment insurance, states raise payroll tax rates on employers who engage in layoffs. Tax rates are, therefore, highest for firms after downturns, potentially hampering labor-market recovery. Using full-population, administrative records from Florida, I estimate the effect of these tax increases on firm behavior leveraging a regression kink design in the tax schedule. Tax hikes reduce hiring and employment substantially, with no effect on layoffs or wages. The results imply unanticipated costs of the financing regime which reduce the optimal benefit by a quarter and account for 12 percent of the unemployment in the wake of the Great Recession.
SEGURO DE DESEMPLEO
FINANCIACION
SOCIEDADES
IMPUESTOS
INCREMENTO
IMPOSICION OPTIMA
American Economic Journal : Economic Policy 1945-7731v. 13, n. 1, February 2021, p. 266-293