Are moderate Leviathans harmful to tax coordination? Jun-Ichi Itaya and Chikara Yamaguchi
By: Itaya, Jun Ichi
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Contributor(s): Yamaguchi, Chikara.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2020Subject(s): ARMONIZACION FISCAL | COMPETENCIA FISCAL NOCIVA | MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
In:
FinanzArchiv v. 76, n. 2, June 2020, 165-190Summary: This study investigates how the sustainability of partial tax coordination among a subset of countries (i.e., a tax union) is affected when the governments' objective function is moderate Leviathan in that policymakers are neither entirely benevolent nor fully self-interested. We show that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail either when moderate-Leviathan-type governments become more revenue-maximizing Leviathans or when more wasteful government expenditure is engaged in. Nevertheless, the well-being of the residents in the member countries of the tax union unambiguously deteriorates, while that in nonmember countries is ambiguous.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 207/2020/2-3 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 207/2020/2-3 |
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This study investigates how the sustainability of partial tax coordination among a subset of countries (i.e., a tax union) is affected when the governments' objective function is moderate Leviathan in that policymakers are neither entirely benevolent nor fully self-interested. We show that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail either when moderate-Leviathan-type governments become more revenue-maximizing Leviathans or when more wasteful government expenditure is engaged in. Nevertheless, the well-being of the residents in the member countries of the tax union unambiguously deteriorates, while that in nonmember countries is ambiguous.
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