Itaya, Jun Ichi

Are moderate Leviathans harmful to tax coordination? / Jun-Ichi Itaya and Chikara Yamaguchi .-- , 2020


Disponible también en formato electrónico.
Resumen.

Bibliografía.

This study investigates how the sustainability of partial tax coordination among a subset of countries (i.e., a tax union) is affected when the governments' objective function is moderate Leviathan in that policymakers are neither entirely benevolent nor fully self-interested. We show that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail either when moderate-Leviathan-type governments become more revenue-maximizing Leviathans or when more wasteful government expenditure is engaged in. Nevertheless, the well-being of the residents in the member countries of the tax union unambiguously deteriorates, while that in nonmember countries is ambiguous.


ARMONIZACION FISCAL
COMPETENCIA FISCAL NOCIVA
MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS


Yamaguchi, Chikara

FinanzArchiv 0015-2218v. 76, n. 2, June 2020, 165-190

Powered by Koha