Maintaining higher taxes and spending more with the line-item veto uncommon events that sting James W. Douglas
By: Douglas, James W
.
Material type: 





Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 1716/2018/2-1 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 1716/2018/2-1 |
Browsing IEF Shelves Close shelf browser
No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | ||
OP 1716/2018/1 Public Budgeting and Finance | OP 1716/2018/1-1 Local fiscal distress | OP 1716/2018/2 Public Budgeting and Finance | OP 1716/2018/2-1 Maintaining higher taxes and spending more with the line-item veto | OP 1716/2018/3 Public Budgeting and Finance | OP 1716/2018/3-1 Fiscal institutional externalities | OP 1716/2018/3-2 Use of special assessments by Municipal Governments in the Chicago Metropolitan Area |
Disponible también en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
Resumen.
Bibliografía.
The scholarly literature provides little evidence that the line-item veto is used effectively by governors in the U.S. states to reduce budget totals or shrink the size of government. By examining the actions of five governors in four states, this study reveals that item vetoes have been used explicitly in several cases to maintain higher levels of taxation and spending. It concludes that under the right conditions at key moments in time the line item veto can be used by governors to have a decisive impact
on state budget outcomes.
There are no comments for this item.