Government fragmentation and fiscal deficits a regression discontinuity approach Joaquín Artés, Ignacio Jurado
By: Artés Caselles, Joaquín
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2018Subject(s): DESCENTRALIZACION ADMINISTRATIVA | PARTIDOS POLITICOS | COMUNIDADES AUTONOMAS | ADMINISTRACION AUTONOMICA | INGRESOS FISCALES | DEFICIT PUBLICO | ESPAÑA | ANÁLISIS DE REGRESIÓNOnline resources: Click here to access online
In:
Public Choice v. 175, n. 3-4, June 2018, p. 367-391Summary: Some electoral systems favor strong single-party majority governments, while others the formation of coalitions. Having one or the other is likely to affect economic outcomes
in ways that are unintended when the electoral rules are approved. In this paper, we show that government fragmentation has large fiscal implications. We also provide results
that have a causal interpretation. Using a panel of Spanish municipalities, along with a close-elections regression discontinuity design, we find that single-party majorities run
budgets with a 1.5% point larger primary surplus than that of coalitions. In addition, we show that lower deficits are driven mainly by single-party majority governments’ capacity
to raise more revenues. These findings are robust to several model specifications.
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Resumen.
Bibliografía.
Some electoral systems favor strong single-party majority governments, while others the formation of coalitions. Having one or the other is likely to affect economic outcomes
in ways that are unintended when the electoral rules are approved. In this paper, we show that government fragmentation has large fiscal implications. We also provide results
that have a causal interpretation. Using a panel of Spanish municipalities, along with a close-elections regression discontinuity design, we find that single-party majorities run
budgets with a 1.5% point larger primary surplus than that of coalitions. In addition, we show that lower deficits are driven mainly by single-party majority governments’ capacity
to raise more revenues. These findings are robust to several model specifications.
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