Artés Caselles, Joaquín
Government fragmentation and fiscal deficits a regression discontinuity approach / Joaquín Artés, Ignacio Jurado .-- , 2018
Disponible también en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
Resumen.
Bibliografía.
Some electoral systems favor strong single-party majority governments, while others the formation of coalitions. Having one or the other is likely to affect economic outcomes
in ways that are unintended when the electoral rules are approved. In this paper, we show that government fragmentation has large fiscal implications. We also provide results
that have a causal interpretation. Using a panel of Spanish municipalities, along with a close-elections regression discontinuity design, we find that single-party majorities run
budgets with a 1.5% point larger primary surplus than that of coalitions. In addition, we show that lower deficits are driven mainly by single-party majority governments’ capacity
to raise more revenues. These findings are robust to several model specifications.
DESCENTRALIZACION ADMINISTRATIVA
PARTIDOS POLITICOS
COMUNIDADES AUTONOMAS
ADMINISTRACION AUTONOMICA
INGRESOS FISCALES
DEFICIT PUBLICO
ESPAÑA
ANÁLISIS DE REGRESIÓN
Public Choice 0048-5829 v. 175, n. 3-4, June 2018, p. 367-391
Government fragmentation and fiscal deficits a regression discontinuity approach / Joaquín Artés, Ignacio Jurado .-- , 2018
Disponible también en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
Resumen.
Bibliografía.
Some electoral systems favor strong single-party majority governments, while others the formation of coalitions. Having one or the other is likely to affect economic outcomes
in ways that are unintended when the electoral rules are approved. In this paper, we show that government fragmentation has large fiscal implications. We also provide results
that have a causal interpretation. Using a panel of Spanish municipalities, along with a close-elections regression discontinuity design, we find that single-party majorities run
budgets with a 1.5% point larger primary surplus than that of coalitions. In addition, we show that lower deficits are driven mainly by single-party majority governments’ capacity
to raise more revenues. These findings are robust to several model specifications.
DESCENTRALIZACION ADMINISTRATIVA
PARTIDOS POLITICOS
COMUNIDADES AUTONOMAS
ADMINISTRACION AUTONOMICA
INGRESOS FISCALES
DEFICIT PUBLICO
ESPAÑA
ANÁLISIS DE REGRESIÓN
Public Choice 0048-5829 v. 175, n. 3-4, June 2018, p. 367-391