Bank taxes, bailouts and financial crisis Michael Keen
By: Keen, Michael James
.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2018Subject(s): BANCOS | IMPUESTOS | CRISIS FINANCIERA | FINANCIACIONOnline resources: Click here to access online
In:
FinanzArchiv v. 74, n. 1, March 2018, p. 4-33Summary: Following the Great Financial Crisis, more than a dozen countries adopted innovative bank taxes as part of their response. This paper characterizes, calibrates and discusses
Pigovian taxes on bank borrowing to address externalities associated with either the collapse of systemic financial institutions or, to prevent that, public guarantees to bail
out their creditors. It also characterizes optimal bailout policy, differentiating between circumstances in which the government can and cannot commit. Building on the analysis for a representative bank, it considers the implications for corrective taxation of various aspects of bank heterogeneity, connectedness, and asymmetries of information.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 207/2018/1-1 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 207/2018/1-1 |
Browsing IEF Shelves Close shelf browser
| No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | ||
| OP 207/2017/4-2 Taxing and subsidizing foreign investors | OP 207/2017/4-3 What do immigrants value most about Switzerland? evidence of the relative importance of income taxes | OP 207/2018/1 FinanzArchiv | OP 207/2018/1-1 Bank taxes, bailouts and financial crisis | OP 207/2018/1-2 Real firms in tax systems | OP 207/2018/2 FinanzArchiv | OP 207/2018/2-1 EMU and the size of the Public Sector |
Disponible en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
Resumen.
Bibliografía.
Following the Great Financial Crisis, more than a dozen countries adopted innovative bank taxes as part of their response. This paper characterizes, calibrates and discusses
Pigovian taxes on bank borrowing to address externalities associated with either the collapse of systemic financial institutions or, to prevent that, public guarantees to bail
out their creditors. It also characterizes optimal bailout policy, differentiating between circumstances in which the government can and cannot commit. Building on the analysis for a representative bank, it considers the implications for corrective taxation of various aspects of bank heterogeneity, connectedness, and asymmetries of information.
Click on an image to view it in the image viewer
There are no comments for this item.