Bank taxes, bailouts and financial crisis Michael Keen
By: Keen, Michael James
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2018Subject(s): BANCOS | IMPUESTOS | CRISIS FINANCIERA | FINANCIACIONOnline resources: Click here to access online
In:
FinanzArchiv v. 74, n. 1, March 2018, p. 4-33Summary: Following the Great Financial Crisis, more than a dozen countries adopted innovative bank taxes as part of their response. This paper characterizes, calibrates and discusses
Pigovian taxes on bank borrowing to address externalities associated with either the collapse of systemic financial institutions or, to prevent that, public guarantees to bail
out their creditors. It also characterizes optimal bailout policy, differentiating between circumstances in which the government can and cannot commit. Building on the analysis for a representative bank, it considers the implications for corrective taxation of various aspects of bank heterogeneity, connectedness, and asymmetries of information.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 207/2018/1-1 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 207/2018/1-1 |
Disponible en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
Resumen.
Bibliografía.
Following the Great Financial Crisis, more than a dozen countries adopted innovative bank taxes as part of their response. This paper characterizes, calibrates and discusses
Pigovian taxes on bank borrowing to address externalities associated with either the collapse of systemic financial institutions or, to prevent that, public guarantees to bail
out their creditors. It also characterizes optimal bailout policy, differentiating between circumstances in which the government can and cannot commit. Building on the analysis for a representative bank, it considers the implications for corrective taxation of various aspects of bank heterogeneity, connectedness, and asymmetries of information.
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