Budget institutions and taxation Lasse Aaskoven
By: Aaskoven, Lasse
.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2018Subject(s): PRESUPUESTOS | GESTION | AUTONOMIA FINANCIERA | IMPUESTOS | UNION EUROPEAOnline resources: Click here to access online
In:
Public Choice v. 174, n. 3-4, March 2018, p. 335-349Summary: While a number of different studies have explored the effects of budgetary procedures and the centralization of the budget process on government debt, deficits and spending, few of them have explored whether such fiscal institutions matter for public
revenue. This article argues that centralizing the budget process raises the levels of taxation by limiting the ability of individual government officials to veto tax increases in line with
common-pool-problem arguments regarding public finances. Using detailed data on budgetary procedures from 15 EU countries, the empirical analysis shows that greater centralization of the budget process increases taxation as a share of GDP and that both the type of budget centralization and level of government fractionalization matter for the size of this
effect. The results suggest that further centralizing the budget process limits government debt and deficits by increasing public revenues as well as constraining public spending.
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| OP 1443/2017/173/1/2 Efficient bilateral taxation of externalities | OP 1443/2018/174/1/2 Public Choice | OP 1443/2018/174/3/4 Public Choice | OP 1443/2018/174/3/4-1 Budget institutions and taxation | OP 1443/2018/175/1/2 Public Choice | OP 1443/2018/175/1/2-1 Self-imposition of public oversight | OP 1443/2018/175/1/2-2 The effect of valence and ideology in campaign conversion |
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Resumen.
Bibliografía.
While a number of different studies have explored the effects of budgetary procedures and the centralization of the budget process on government debt, deficits and spending, few of them have explored whether such fiscal institutions matter for public
revenue. This article argues that centralizing the budget process raises the levels of taxation by limiting the ability of individual government officials to veto tax increases in line with
common-pool-problem arguments regarding public finances. Using detailed data on budgetary procedures from 15 EU countries, the empirical analysis shows that greater centralization of the budget process increases taxation as a share of GDP and that both the type of budget centralization and level of government fractionalization matter for the size of this
effect. The results suggest that further centralizing the budget process limits government debt and deficits by increasing public revenues as well as constraining public spending.
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