Education inequality among different social groups Kaname Miyagishima
By: Miyagishima, Kaname
.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2016Subject(s): EDUCACION | PLANIFICACION ESTRATEGICA | POLITICA EDUCATIVA | DESIGUALDAD | GRUPOS SOCIALESOnline resources: Click here to access online
In:
Hacienda Pública Española n. 217 (2/2016), p. 11-35Summary: In this paper, we study an education-planning problem by using a mechanism design approach. We consider a model where agents have different abilities in acquiring education and belong to different social groups (for instance, races or genders). Under the information constraint that the abilities of agentsare observable and group memberships are unobservable, we derive two sets of education policies derived under Rawlsian and utilitarian social welfare functions. Our main results show that the utilitarian planner does not discriminate agents by their social group membership, while the Rawlsian planner provides a form of affirmative action policy. We also study second-best optimal education policies in the case of general degrees of inequality aversion. In this case, it is shown that affirmative action is not necessarily supported, and the differences in education levels are determined by the agents. marginal effects of utility to their group.s aggregated welfare.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEF | HPE/2016/217-1 (Browse shelf) | Available | HPE/2016/217-1 |
Dispone de versión electrónica. Resumen. Bibliografía. Conclusión.
In this paper, we study an education-planning problem by using a mechanism design approach. We consider a model where agents have different abilities in acquiring education and belong to different social groups (for instance, races or genders). Under the information constraint that the abilities of agentsare observable and group memberships are unobservable, we derive two sets of education policies derived under Rawlsian and utilitarian social welfare functions. Our main results show that the utilitarian planner does not discriminate agents by their social group membership, while the Rawlsian planner provides a form of affirmative action policy. We also study second-best optimal education policies in the case of general degrees of inequality aversion. In this case, it is shown that affirmative action is not necessarily supported, and the differences in education levels are determined by the agents. marginal effects of utility to their group.s aggregated welfare.
There are no comments for this item.