Intergovernmental fiscal transfer and local incentives and responses the case of Indonesia Blane D. Lewis and Paul Smoke
By: Lewis, Blane D
.
Contributor(s): Smoke, Paul.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2017Subject(s): ADMINISTRACION TRIBUTARIA | COLABORACION TRIBUTARIA | COOPERACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA | CORRESPONSABILIDAD FISCAL | HACIENDAS LOCALES | INCENTIVOS FISCALES | INDONESIA
In:
Fiscal Studies v. 38, n. 1, March 2017, p. 111-139Summary: Indonesian policymakers are convinced that a number of perverse incentives are embedded in their system of intergovernmental transfers. Officials in countries throughout the developing world have similar views about their own intergovernmental frameworks. In Indonesia, perverse incentives are thought to negatively influence a wide range of local government fiscal behaviours, including as regards own-source revenues, spending and savings. An empirical analysis ofthe local government response to transfers, however, offers only mixed support for the existence and strength of the presumed incentives. Overall, the findingsin this paper highlight the benefits to central governments of rigorously examining assumed perverse incentives in their intergovernmental frameworks before embarking on attempts to expunge them.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEF | OP 1472/2017/1-2 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 1472/2017/1-2 |
Browsing IEF Shelves Close shelf browser
Disponible en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF. Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía.
Indonesian policymakers are convinced that a number of perverse incentives are embedded in their system of intergovernmental transfers. Officials in countries throughout the developing world have similar views about their own intergovernmental frameworks. In Indonesia, perverse incentives are thought to negatively influence a wide range of local government fiscal behaviours, including as regards own-source revenues, spending and savings. An empirical analysis ofthe local government response to transfers, however, offers only mixed support for the existence and strength of the presumed incentives. Overall, the findingsin this paper highlight the benefits to central governments of rigorously examining assumed perverse incentives in their intergovernmental frameworks before embarking on attempts to expunge them.
There are no comments for this item.