Lewis, Blane D.
Intergovernmental fiscal transfer and local incentives and responses the case of Indonesia / Blane D. Lewis and Paul Smoke .-- , 2017
Disponible en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF. Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía.
Indonesian policymakers are convinced that a number of perverse incentives are embedded in their system of intergovernmental transfers. Officials in countries throughout the developing world have similar views about their own intergovernmental frameworks. In Indonesia, perverse incentives are thought to negatively influence a wide range of local government fiscal behaviours, including as regards own-source revenues, spending and savings. An empirical analysis ofthe local government response to transfers, however, offers only mixed support for the existence and strength of the presumed incentives. Overall, the findingsin this paper highlight the benefits to central governments of rigorously examining assumed perverse incentives in their intergovernmental frameworks before embarking on attempts to expunge them.
ADMINISTRACION TRIBUTARIA
COLABORACION TRIBUTARIA
COOPERACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA
CORRESPONSABILIDAD FISCAL
HACIENDAS LOCALES
INCENTIVOS FISCALES
INDONESIA
Smoke, Paul
Fiscal Studiesv. 38, n. 1, March 2017, p. 111-139
Intergovernmental fiscal transfer and local incentives and responses the case of Indonesia / Blane D. Lewis and Paul Smoke .-- , 2017
Disponible en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF. Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía.
Indonesian policymakers are convinced that a number of perverse incentives are embedded in their system of intergovernmental transfers. Officials in countries throughout the developing world have similar views about their own intergovernmental frameworks. In Indonesia, perverse incentives are thought to negatively influence a wide range of local government fiscal behaviours, including as regards own-source revenues, spending and savings. An empirical analysis ofthe local government response to transfers, however, offers only mixed support for the existence and strength of the presumed incentives. Overall, the findingsin this paper highlight the benefits to central governments of rigorously examining assumed perverse incentives in their intergovernmental frameworks before embarking on attempts to expunge them.
ADMINISTRACION TRIBUTARIA
COLABORACION TRIBUTARIA
COOPERACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA
CORRESPONSABILIDAD FISCAL
HACIENDAS LOCALES
INCENTIVOS FISCALES
INDONESIA
Smoke, Paul
Fiscal Studiesv. 38, n. 1, March 2017, p. 111-139