Direct democracy and local public finances under cooperative federalism Zareh Asatryan ... [et al.]
Contributor(s): Asatryan, Zareh
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2017Subject(s): DEMOCRACIA | POLITICA FISCAL | HACIENDAS LOCALES | FEDERALISMO FISCAL | ALEMANIA | ANÁLISIS DE REGRESIÓN
In:
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics v. 119, n. 3, 2017, p. 801-820Summary: In this paper, we exploit the introduction of the right of local initiatives in the German state of Bavaria in 1995 in order to study the fiscal effects of direct democracy. Our identification strategy combines difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity methods: we compare municipal expenditure and revenue between pre- and post-reform periods at population thresholds where the signatures needed to launch initiatives and minimum quorum requirements decrease discontinuously (difference-in-discontinuities design). The results suggest that stronger direct democratic institutions lead to an expansion of local government size.
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| OP 1376/2016/4-3 Dividend taxes and income shifting | OP 1376/2017/1 Intergenerational mobility | OP 1376/2017/2 A characteristics approach to optimal taxation | OP 1376/2017/3 Direct democracy and local public finances under cooperative federalism | OP 1376/2017/4 Optimal Income Taxtaion and Job Choice | OP 1376/2018/120/1 The Scandinavian Journal of Economics | OP 1376/2018/2 The Scandinavian Journal of Economics |
Disponible también en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Bibliografía. Conclusión.
In this paper, we exploit the introduction of the right of local initiatives in the German state of Bavaria in 1995 in order to study the fiscal effects of direct democracy. Our identification strategy combines difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity methods: we compare municipal expenditure and revenue between pre- and post-reform periods at population thresholds where the signatures needed to launch initiatives and minimum quorum requirements decrease discontinuously (difference-in-discontinuities design). The results suggest that stronger direct democratic institutions lead to an expansion of local government size.
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