Direct democracy and local public finances under cooperative federalism Zareh Asatryan ... [et al.]
Contributor(s): Asatryan, Zareh
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2017Subject(s): DEMOCRACIA | POLITICA FISCAL | HACIENDAS LOCALES | FEDERALISMO FISCAL | ALEMANIA | ANÁLISIS DE REGRESIÓN
In:
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics v. 119, n. 3, 2017, p. 801-820Summary: In this paper, we exploit the introduction of the right of local initiatives in the German state of Bavaria in 1995 in order to study the fiscal effects of direct democracy. Our identification strategy combines difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity methods: we compare municipal expenditure and revenue between pre- and post-reform periods at population thresholds where the signatures needed to launch initiatives and minimum quorum requirements decrease discontinuously (difference-in-discontinuities design). The results suggest that stronger direct democratic institutions lead to an expansion of local government size.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEF | OP 1376/2017/3 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 1376/2017/3 |
Disponible también en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Bibliografía. Conclusión.
In this paper, we exploit the introduction of the right of local initiatives in the German state of Bavaria in 1995 in order to study the fiscal effects of direct democracy. Our identification strategy combines difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity methods: we compare municipal expenditure and revenue between pre- and post-reform periods at population thresholds where the signatures needed to launch initiatives and minimum quorum requirements decrease discontinuously (difference-in-discontinuities design). The results suggest that stronger direct democratic institutions lead to an expansion of local government size.
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