The role of central bank independence on optimal taxation and seigniorage Roberto Delhy Nolivos, Guillermo Vuletin
By: Nolivos, Roberto Delhy
.
Contributor(s): Vuletin, Guillermo Javier.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2014Subject(s): BANCO CENTRAL | POLITICA MONETARIA | POLITICA FISCAL | IMPOSICION OPTIMA | INFLACION | MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
In:
European Journal of Political Economy v. 34, June 2014, p. 440-458
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEF | OP 1912/2014/34-8 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 1912/2014/34-8 |
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Disponible también en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituo deEstudios Fiscales. Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía.
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