Gradstein, Mark
Self-imposition of public oversight / Mark Gradstein .-- , 2018
Disponible en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
Resumen.
Bibliografía.
We argue that policymakers may have personal interests in policy restraints channeled through public oversight. Self-imposition of public oversight can be beneficial for the policymaker because it may help alleviate the dynamic inconsistency problem that she otherwise faces. In the setting studied herein, self-imposed public oversight takes the
form of a ceiling on tax rates, which can be overridden only with the legislature’s consent. Such a mechanism is shown to credibly commit the policymaker to future tax restraint, thus inducing larger productive effort.
AUTOLIQUIDACIONES
IMPUESTOS
ESTADOS UNIDOS
Public Choice 0048-5829 v. 175, n. 1-2, April 2018, p. 95-109
Self-imposition of public oversight / Mark Gradstein .-- , 2018
Disponible en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
Resumen.
Bibliografía.
We argue that policymakers may have personal interests in policy restraints channeled through public oversight. Self-imposition of public oversight can be beneficial for the policymaker because it may help alleviate the dynamic inconsistency problem that she otherwise faces. In the setting studied herein, self-imposed public oversight takes the
form of a ceiling on tax rates, which can be overridden only with the legislature’s consent. Such a mechanism is shown to credibly commit the policymaker to future tax restraint, thus inducing larger productive effort.
AUTOLIQUIDACIONES
IMPUESTOS
ESTADOS UNIDOS
Public Choice 0048-5829 v. 175, n. 1-2, April 2018, p. 95-109