Fiscal federalism and lobbying Massimo Bordignon, Luca Colombo, Umberto Galmarini
By: Bordignon, Massimo
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Contributor(s): Colombo, Luca | Galmarini, Umberto.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2008Subject(s): FEDERALISMO FISCAL | DESCENTRALIZACION FISCAL | GRUPOS DE PRESION | MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
In:
Journal of public economics v. 92, n. 12, December 2008, p. 2288-2301
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEF | OP 730/2008/92/12-2 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 730/2008/92/12-2 |
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| OP 730/2008/92/1/2-1 Education, preferences for leisure and the optimal income tax schedule | OP 730/2008/92/12-10 Are regional asymmetries detrimental to tax coordination in a repeated game setting ? | OP 730/2008/92/1/2-2 Government spending and intergenerational mobility | OP 730/2008/92/12-2 Fiscal federalism and lobbying | OP 730/2008/92/1/2-3 Labor supply, deadweight loss and Tax Reform Act of 1986 | OP 730/2008/92/12-3 The effects of partisan alignment on the allocation of intergovernmentaltransfers | OP 730/2008/92/1/2-4 Is partial tax harmonization desirable ? |
Resumen. Conclusión. Apéndice. Bibliografía.
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