Minimizing the threat of a positive majority deficit in two - rier voting systems with equipopulous units Claus Beisbart, Luc Bovens
By: Beisbart, Claus
.
Contributor(s): Bovens, Luc.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2013Subject(s): DEFICIT PUBLICO | VOTO | ELECCIONES | POLITICA ECONOMICA | ESTADOS UNIDOS
In:
Public Choice v. 154, n. 1-2, January 2013, p. 75-94
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEF | OP 1443/2013/154/1/2-4 (Browse shelf) | Available |
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| OP 1443/2013/154/1/2-1 The resource curse revisited | OP 1443/2013/154/1/2-2 Charitable giving in the German welfare state | OP 1443/2013/154/1/2-3 The politics of digits | OP 1443/2013/154/1/2-4 Minimizing the threat of a positive majority deficit in two - rier voting systems with equipopulous units | OP 1443/2013/154/3/4-1 Trade openness and public expenditure : the Spanish case | OP 1443/2013/154/3/4-2 The timing of elections in federalism | OP 1443/2013/154/3/4-3 Bicameral bargaining and federation formation |
Disponible en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía.
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