Leviathan and fiscal illusion in local government overlapping jurisdictions Rebecca J. Campbell
By: Campbell, Rebecca J
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2004Subject(s): HACIENDAS LOCALES | CONFLICTOS JURISDICCIONALES | DOBLE IMPOSICION | POLITICA FISCAL | ESTADOS UNIDOS | MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
In:
Public Choice v. 120, n. 3-4, September 2004, p. 301-329
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEF | OP 1443/2004/120/3/4 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 1443/2004/120/3/4 |
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| OP 1443/2004/119/1/2-3 The public acceptance of green taxes | OP 1443/2004/119/3/4-1 Taxes, budgetary rule and majority voting | OP 1443/2004/119/3/4-2 A public choice perspective of IMF and World Bank lending and conditionality | OP 1443/2004/120/3/4 Leviathan and fiscal illusion in local government overlapping jurisdictions | OP 1443/2004/121/1/2 Coalition governments versus minority governments | OP 1443/2005/122/1/2-1 Testing the Mill hypothesis of fiscal illusion | OP 1443/2005/122/1/2-2 Tax morale in Latin America |
Bibliografía. Apéndice.
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