Constrained efficient fine - cum - tax rate structures the case of constant relative risk aversion by K. L. Glen Ueng and C. C. Yang
By: Ueng, K.L. Glen
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Contributor(s): Yang, Cheng Chen.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2004Subject(s): EVASION FISCAL | CONTRIBUYENTES | COMPORTAMIENTO TRIBUTARIO | IMPOSICION OPTIMA | RIESGO | CUMPLIMIENTO FISCAL
In:
Economica v.71, n. 283, p. 461-482
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEF | OP 283/2004/283-3 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 283/2004/283-3 |
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| OP 283/2004/283 Economics of Law Enforcement | OP 283/2004/283-1 Settlement in tax evasion prosecution | OP 283/2004/283-2 Discretion in tax enforcement | OP 283/2004/283-3 Constrained efficient fine - cum - tax rate structures | OP 283/2004/283-4 Might fundamental tax reform increase criminal activity ? | OP 283/2005/285 Fiscal policy with agents differing in altruism and ability | OP 283/2007/294-1 Fiscal policy coordination and international trade |
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