The political economy of sales taxes and sales tax exemptions Thomas Stratmann
By: Stratmann, Thomas
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Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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IEF | OP 1443/2017/171/1/2 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 1443/2017/171/1/2 |
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OP 1443/2017/170/1/2 Do European fiscal rules induce a bias in fiscal forecasts ? | OP 1443/2017/170/3/4-1 On the political economy of national tax revenue forecast | OP 1443/2017/170/3/4-2 The effect of school district and minicipal government financial health information on local tax election outcomes | OP 1443/2017/171/1/2 The political economy of sales taxes and sales tax exemptions | OP 1443/2017/171/3/4 Decentralization and the duration of fiscal consolidation | OP 1443/2017/172/1/2 Quadratic voting and the public good | OP 1443/2017/173/1/2 Efficient bilateral taxation of externalities |
Disponible también en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía. Apéndice.
I analyze the choice politicians face when seeking votes from groups that lobby for sales tax rate decreases or tax exemptions, given the constraint that politicians want to raise a certain amount of revenue. Using data on sales taxes, I develop a model predicting a positive relationship between the number of exemptions and the sales tax rate. The estimation results provide support for this prediction. Each additional exemption is associated with an increase of between 0.10 and 0.25 percentage points in the tax rate.
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