Compulsory voting, turnout and government spending evidence from Austria by Mitchell Hoffman, Gianmarco León, María Lmobardi
By: Hoffman, Mitchell
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Contributor(s): León, Gianmarco | Lombardi, María.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2017Subject(s): POLITICA FISCAL | VOTO | ELECCIONES | INCENTIVOS | ESPAÑA
In:
Journal of public economics v. 145, January 2017, p. 103-115
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEF | OP 730/2017/145-1 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 730/2017/145-1 |
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| OP 730/2016/143-4 Effort, luck and voting for redistribution | OP 730/2016/144-1 Optimal tax mix with income tax non - compliance | OP 730/2016/144-2 Optimal taxation when people do not maximize well - being | OP 730/2017/145-1 Compulsory voting, turnout and government spending | OP 730/2017/145-2 The fiscal cost of weak governance | OP 730/2017/145-3 The optimal deterrence of tax evasion | OP 730/2017/146 Redistribution and insurance with simple tax instruments |
Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía.
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