The limits of tax and expenditure limits TEL implementation as a principal - agent problem Ellen C. Seljan
By: Seljan, Ellen C
.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2014Subject(s): POLITICA FISCAL | PRESION FISCAL | GASTO PUBLICO | ESTADOS UNIDOS | ANALISIS DE PANELES
In:
Public Choice v. 159, n. 3-4, June 2014, p. 485-501
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEF | OP 1443/2014/159/3/4-2 (Browse shelf) | Available |
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| OP 1443/2014/158/3/4 Empirical social choice | OP 1443/2014/159/1/2 On the political and fiscal determinants of income redistribution under federalism and democracy | OP 1443/2014/159/3/4-1 Political institutions and income ( re - ) distribution | OP 1443/2014/159/3/4-2 The limits of tax and expenditure limits | OP 1443/2014/159/3/4-3 Electoral misgovernance cycles | OP 1443/2014/160/3/4 Immigration, redistribution and universal suffrage | OP 1443/2014/161/1/2-1 Distribution of transfer and soft budget spending behaviors |
Disponible también en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía. Apéndice.
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