Do large cabinets favor large governments ? evidence on the fiscal commons problem for Swiss Cantons Christoph A. Schaltegger, Lars P. Feld
By: Schaltegger, Christoph A
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Contributor(s): Feld, Lars P.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2009Subject(s): POLITICA FISCAL | AUTONOMIA TRIBUTARIA | DESCENTRALIZACION FISCAL | FEDERALISMO FISCAL | SUIZA
In:
Journal of public economics v. 93, n. 1-2, February 2009, p. 35-47
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEF | OP 730/2009/1/2-1 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 730/2009/1/2-1 |
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| OP 730/2009/11/12-2 Separability and public finance | OP 730/2009/11/12-3 Taxing education in Ramsey's tradition | OP 730/2009/11/12-4 Tax competition with parasitic tax havens | OP 730/2009/1/2-1 Do large cabinets favor large governments ? | OP 730/2009/1/2-2 What does tax aggressiveness signal ? | OP 730/2009/1/2-3 Dividend taxation and intertemporal tax arbitrage ? | OP 730/2009/1/2-4 The taxman tools up |
Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía.
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