Optimal national policies towards multinationals when local regions can choose between firm - specific and non - firm - specific policies Osiris J. Parcero
By: Parcero, Osiris J
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Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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IEF | OP 207/2017/3-2 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 207/2017/3-2 |
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Disponible también en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía.
This paper looks at a country's optimal central-government optimalpolicy in a settingwhere its two identical local jurisdictions compete to attract footloose multinationals totheir sites, and where the considered ultinationals strictly prefer this country to the restof the world. For the sake of realism the model allows the local jurisdictions to choosebetween firm-specific and non-firm-specific policies. We show that the implementationof the jurisdictional firm-specific policy is weakly welfare dominant. Hence the frequentcalls for the central government to ban the former type of policies go against the adviceof this paper.
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