Strategic delegation in asymmetric tax competition Hikaru Ogawa, TaikiSusa
By: Ogawa, Hikaru
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2017Subject(s): COMPETENCIA FISCAL NOCIVA | DEMOCRACIA | MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
In:
Economics & Politics ; v. 29, n. 3, November 2017, p. 237-251Summary: This study examines asymmetric tax competition under representative democracy systems. The findings show that the degree of asymmetry between countries affects the result of elections in each country, where the citizens selecta policy-maker to set a tax rate for the country.In particular, under certainconditions, a decisive voter in the election can select a citizen whose share of the country.s capital is higher than the decisive voter.s own share.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEF | OP 1892/2017/3 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 1892/2017/3 |
Disponible también en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Bibliografía. Resumen.
This study examines asymmetric tax competition under representative democracy systems. The findings show that the degree of asymmetry between countries affects the result of elections in each country, where the citizens selecta policy-maker to set a tax rate for the country.In particular, under certainconditions, a decisive voter in the election can select a citizen whose share of the country.s capital is higher than the decisive voter.s own share.
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