The fiscal benefits of repeated cooperation coalitions and debt dynamics in 36 democracies David Weisstanner
By: Weisstanner, David
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2017Subject(s): PARTIDOS POLITICOS | POLITICA FISCAL | NEGOCIACION | DEUDA PUBLICA | GOBIERNO
In:
Journal of Public Policy v. 37, n. 2, June 2017, p. 143-172Summary: Do coalition governments really suffer from short time horizons infiscal policymaking, as posited by standard political-economy models? This article focusses on coalitions that have created high levels of familiarity through sharedgoverning experiences in the past and that are likely to cooperate againin future governing coalitions. I argue that such coalitions have incentives tointernalise the future costs of debt accumulation and reach credible agreementsto balance their constituencies. fiscal preferences. Moreover, sustaining broadcoalitions should have electoral advantages to implementing controversial economic reforms, thusresulting in lower debt increases compared not only with lessdurable coalitions but also with single-party governments. Comparing 36 economically advanced democracies between (up to) 1962 and 2013, I estimate the effectsof coalitions.cooperation prospects on the dynamics of public debt. The findings indicate that long time horizons can help coalitions to overcome intertemporalcoordination problems and to reach specific policy goals.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEF | OP 1793/2017/2 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 1793/2017/2 |
Disponible en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía.
Do coalition governments really suffer from short time horizons infiscal policymaking, as posited by standard political-economy models? This article focusses on coalitions that have created high levels of familiarity through sharedgoverning experiences in the past and that are likely to cooperate againin future governing coalitions. I argue that such coalitions have incentives tointernalise the future costs of debt accumulation and reach credible agreementsto balance their constituencies. fiscal preferences. Moreover, sustaining broadcoalitions should have electoral advantages to implementing controversial economic reforms, thusresulting in lower debt increases compared not only with lessdurable coalitions but also with single-party governments. Comparing 36 economically advanced democracies between (up to) 1962 and 2013, I estimate the effectsof coalitions.cooperation prospects on the dynamics of public debt. The findings indicate that long time horizons can help coalitions to overcome intertemporalcoordination problems and to reach specific policy goals.
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