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Tax compliance as an evolutionary coordination game an agent - based approach Kim Bloomquist

Material type: Article

ArticlePublisher: 2011Subject(s): TEORIA DE LOS JUEGOS

In: Public Finance Review v. 39, n. 1, January 2011, p. 25-49

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Item type	Current location	Home library	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode
		IEF	OP 581/2011/1-2 (Browse shelf)	Available		OP 581/2011/1-2

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Previous	OP 581/2010/6-2 Tiebout competition, yardstick competition and tax instrument choice	OP 581/2010/6-3 Majority rule versus supermajority rules	OP 581/2011/1-1 Penalties in the theory of equilibrium tax evasion	OP 581/2011/1-2 Tax compliance as an evolutionary coordination game	OP 581/2011/1-3 Dynamic scoring, tax evasion and shadow economy	OP 581/2011/1-4 Undeclared work, employer tax compliance and audits	OP 581/2011/1-5 Taxpayer behavior when audit rules are known	Next

Disponible en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía.

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