The political economy of tax coordination as a bargaining game between bureaucrats and politicians Fuest, Clemens
By: Fuest, Clemens
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2000Subject(s): POLITICA ECONOMICA | POLITICA FISCAL | IMPUESTOS | BIENES PUBLICOS
In:
Public choice vol. 103, nº 3-4, p. 357-382
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEF | op 1443/2000/103/3/4 (Browse shelf) | Available | op 1443/2000/103/3/4 |
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| OP 1443/2000/102/3/4-1 Fiscal policy, deficits and politics of subnational governments: the case of the German Laender | OP 1443/2000/102/3/4-2 Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union | OP 1443/2000/103/1/2 Polician's opinions on tax reform | op 1443/2000/103/3/4 The political economy of tax coordination as a bargaining game between bureaucrats and politicians | op 1443/2000/104/1/2 Exemption or taxation for profits of non-profits? An answer from a modelincorporating managerial discretion | OP 1443/2000/105/1/2-1 Corruption, tax evasion and the Laffer curve | OP 1443/2000/105/1/2-2 Success and failure of fiscal consolidation in the OECD |
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