Corporate tax shaming Michelle Hanlon, Jeffrey L. Hoopes, and Douglas A. Shackelford
By: Hanlon, Michelle Lee
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Contributor(s): Hoopes, Jeffrey L | Shackelford, Douglas Alan | Slemrod, Joel B.
Material type: 
ArticleSubject(s): INVESTIGACION | EVASION FISCAL | CUMPLIMIENTO FISCAL | ESTADOS UNIDOS
In:
National Tax Journal v.78, n.3, September 2025, p. 767-788Summary: This paper serves two purposes. First, it is a tribute to Joel Slemrod from tax accountants. Joel worked with many accounting researchers, and we honor this work. Second, we review a literature Joel helped start: the literature on the reputational costs of tax avoidance and tax shaming’s effectiveness in increasing tax compliance. We explore the evidence that consumers, employees, politicians, suppliers, or investors impose meaningful reputational costs on firms engaged in tax avoidance. We conclude that, while firms often perceive reputational risks and adjust behavior to avoid public scrutiny, the empirical evidence does not provide strong support for actual meaningful stakeholder responses.
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| OP 233/2025/3-2 Only connect! | OP 233/2025/3-3 Undeterred | OP 233/2025/3-4 Shifting and other problems with taxable income elasticity | OP 233/2025/3-5 Corporate tax shaming | OP 234 The American Economic Review | OP 234 The American Economic Review | OP 234/1930/1 Classifications of Public Expenditures. |
This paper serves two purposes. First, it is a tribute to Joel Slemrod from tax accountants. Joel worked with many accounting researchers, and we honor this work. Second, we review a literature Joel helped start: the literature on the reputational costs of tax avoidance and tax shaming’s effectiveness in increasing tax compliance. We explore the evidence that consumers, employees, politicians, suppliers, or investors impose meaningful reputational costs on firms engaged in tax avoidance. We conclude that, while firms often perceive reputational risks and adjust behavior to avoid public scrutiny, the empirical evidence does not provide strong support for actual meaningful stakeholder responses.
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