Do local tax preparers strengthen the influence of tax policy on individual behavior? Paul E. Madsen and Stephanie Walton
By: Madsen, Paul E
.
Contributor(s): Walton, Stephanie.
Material type: 
ArticleSubject(s): CODIGOS TRIBUTARIOS | POLITICA SOCIAL | CONTRIBUYENTES | DEDUCCIONES TRIBUTARIAS | ESTADOS UNIDOS
In:
National Tax Journal v.78, n.3, September 2025, p. 637-671Summary: One function of the tax code is to implement social policy, incentivizing taxpayers to make decisions policy makers believe to be desirable. However, the US tax code is complex and costly for taxpayers to understand and process. In this study, we hypothesize that tax preparers serve as information intermediaries between policy makers and taxpayers, reducing information frictions in the implementation of tax-based social policy. Our tests using geographical concentrations of tax preparers, changes in purchasing patterns for millions of tax-credit-eligible appliances, and speed of uptake of novel energy efficiency tax credits in millions of individual tax returns generally support our predictions.
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One function of the tax code is to implement social policy, incentivizing taxpayers to make decisions policy makers believe to be desirable. However, the US tax code is complex and costly for taxpayers to understand and process. In this study, we hypothesize that tax preparers serve as information intermediaries between policy makers and taxpayers, reducing information frictions in the implementation of tax-based social policy. Our tests using geographical concentrations of tax preparers, changes in purchasing patterns for millions of tax-credit-eligible appliances, and speed of uptake of novel energy efficiency tax credits in millions of individual tax returns generally support our predictions.
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