Trade and domestic policies under monopolistic competition Alessia Campolmi, Harald Fadinger, Chiara Forlati
By: Campolmi, Alessia
.
Contributor(s): Fadinger, Harald | Forlati, Chiara.
Material type: 
ArticleSubject(s): COMERCIO | ECONOMIAS DE ESCALA | POLITICA COMERCIAL | POLITICA INTERNACIONAL | ACUERDOS COMERCIALES
In:
The Economic Journal v. 135, n. 667, April 2025, p. 892-913Summary: Should trade agreements constrain domestic policies? We analyse this question using a model with monopolistic competition and constant-elasticity-of-substitution demand. We develop a welfare decomposition to show that welfare changes induced by trade and domestic policies can be decomposed into consumption and production efficiencies and terms-of-trade effects. We analyse the reasons to sign trade agreements and compare shallow and deep trade agreements, modelled according to GATT-WTO rules. Under monopolistic competition, unlike deep trade agreements, shallow agreements with market access commitments may not achieve efficiency because terms of trade can be improved without reducing market access by increasing the set of foreign firms selling domestically.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 282/2025/667-2 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 282/2025/667-2 |
Browsing IEF Shelves Close shelf browser
| No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | ||
| OP 282/2025/665-1 Optimal taxation of capital income with heterogeneous rates of return | OP 282/2025/667 The Economic Journal | OP 282/2025/667-1 Earnings responses to even higher taxes open access | OP 282/2025/667-2 Trade and domestic policies under monopolistic competition | OP 282/32/922 Trade Board and the Cave Committee | op 283 Economica | OP 283 Economica |
Bibliografía.
Should trade agreements constrain domestic policies? We analyse this question using a model with monopolistic competition and constant-elasticity-of-substitution demand. We develop a welfare decomposition to show that welfare changes induced by trade and domestic policies can be decomposed into consumption and production efficiencies and terms-of-trade effects. We analyse the reasons to sign trade agreements and compare shallow and deep trade agreements, modelled according to GATT-WTO rules. Under monopolistic competition, unlike deep trade agreements, shallow agreements with market access commitments may not achieve efficiency because terms of trade can be improved without reducing market access by increasing the set of foreign firms selling domestically.
There are no comments for this item.