A new era of midnight mergers antitrust risk and investor disclosures by John M. Barrios and Thomas G. Wollmann
By: Barrios, John M
.
Contributor(s): Wollmann, Thomas G.
Material type: 
ArticleSubject(s): COMPETENCIA | MONOPOLIOS | FINANCIACION | RIESGO | INVERSIONES
In:
American Economic Journal : Microeconomics v. 16, n. 4, November 2024, p. 77-111.Summary: Antitrust authorities search public documents to discover anti-competitive mergers. Thus, investor disclosures may alert them to deals that would otherwise go undetected, creating disincentives for managers to divulge certain transactions. We study this behavior in publicly traded US companies. First, we employ a regression discontinuity approach to estimate the effect of mandatory disclosures. We find that releasing information to investors poses antitrust risk. Second, we introduce a method for measuring undisclosed mergers that relies on financial accounting reporting requirements. We find that undisclosed mergers total $1.85 trillion between 2002 and 2016.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 2136/2024/4-1 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 2136/2024/4-1 |
Browsing IEF Shelves Close shelf browser
| No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | ||
| OP 2136/2024/2-2 Contingent reasoning and dynamic public goods provision | OP 2136/2024/3 American Economic Journal : Microeconomics | OP 2136/2024/4 American Economic Journal : Microeconomics | OP 2136/2024/4-1 A new era of midnight mergers | OP 2136/2024/4-2 Noncompete agreements and the welfare of consumers | OP 2136/2024/4-3 Bargaining in the shadow of uncertainty | OP 2137 American Economic Journal : Macroeconomics |
Bibliografía
Antitrust authorities search public documents to discover anti-competitive mergers. Thus, investor disclosures may alert them to deals that would otherwise go undetected, creating disincentives for managers to divulge certain transactions. We study this behavior in publicly traded US companies. First, we employ a regression discontinuity approach to estimate the effect of mandatory disclosures. We find that releasing information to investors poses antitrust risk. Second, we introduce a method for measuring undisclosed mergers that relies on financial accounting reporting requirements. We find that undisclosed mergers total $1.85 trillion between 2002 and 2016.
There are no comments for this item.