Micro risks and (robust) pareto-improving policies Mark Aguiar, Manuel Amador, and Cristina Arellano
By: Aguiar, Mark
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Contributor(s): Amador, Manuel
| Arellano, Cristina
.
Material type: 




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OP 234/2024/11 The American Economic Review | OP 234/2024/11-1 Sticky spending, sequestration, and government debt | OP 234/2024/11-2 The dynamic consequences of state building | OP 234/2024/11-3 Micro risks and (robust) pareto-improving policies | OP 234/2024/1-2 Retirement consumption and pension design | OP 234/2024/12 The American Economic Review | OP 234/2024/12-1 Decisions under risk are decisions under complexity |
Bibliografía.
We provide conditions for the feasibility of robust Pareto-improving (RPI) policies when markets are incomplete and the interest rate is below the growth rate. We allow for arbitrary heterogeneity in preferences and income risk and a wedge between the return to capital and bonds. An RPI improves risk sharing and can induce a more efficient level of capital. Elasticities of aggregate savings to changes in interest rates are the crucial ingredients to the feasibility of RPIs. Government debt may complement rather than substitute for capital in an RPI. Our analysis emphasizes the welfare-improving qualities of government bonds versus explicit redistribution.
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