The dynamic consequences of state building evidence from the French Revolution Cédric Chambru, Emeric Henry, and Benjamin Marx
By: Chambru, Cédric
.
Contributor(s): Henry, Emeric | Marx, Benjamin.
Material type: 
ArticleSubject(s): DESARROLLO ECONOMICO | 1789-1799 (REVOLUCION) | BIENES PUBLICOS | DIVISIONES TERRITORIALES
In:
The American Economic Review v. 114, n.11, November 2024, p. 3578-3622.Summary: How do radical reforms shape economic development over time? In 1790, the French Constituent Assembly overhauled the kingdom's organization to establish new local capitals. In some departments, the choice of local capitals over rival candidate cities was plausibly exogenous. We study how changes in administrative presence affect state capacity and development in the ensuing decades. In the short run, administrative proximity increases taxation and investments in law enforcement. In the long run, capitals obtain more public goods and grow faster. Our results shed light on the dynamic impacts of state building following one of history's most ambitious administrative reforms.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 234/2024/11-2 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 234/2024/11-2 |
Browsing IEF Shelves Close shelf browser
| No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | ||
| OP 234/2024/1-1 Universal basic income | OP 234/2024/11 The American Economic Review | OP 234/2024/11-1 Sticky spending, sequestration, and government debt | OP 234/2024/11-2 The dynamic consequences of state building | OP 234/2024/11-3 Micro risks and (robust) pareto-improving policies | OP 234/2024/1-2 Retirement consumption and pension design | OP 234/2024/12 The American Economic Review |
Bibliografía.
How do radical reforms shape economic development over time? In 1790, the French Constituent Assembly overhauled the kingdom's organization to establish new local capitals. In some departments, the choice of local capitals over rival candidate cities was plausibly exogenous. We study how changes in administrative presence affect state capacity and development in the ensuing decades. In the short run, administrative proximity increases taxation and investments in law enforcement. In the long run, capitals obtain more public goods and grow faster. Our results shed light on the dynamic impacts of state building following one of history's most ambitious administrative reforms.
There are no comments for this item.