GLoBE electrónico the potential costs of cooperation Tsilly Dagan
By: Dagan, Tsilly
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Material type: 
ArticleSubject(s): SEGUNDO PILAR (OCDE) | IMPUESTO DE SOCIEDADES | TIPO MÍNIMO GLOBAL | EVALUACION | FISCALIDAD INTERNACIONAL | PAISES EN DESARROLLO
In:
Intertax v. 51, issue 10, October 2023, 12 p. Summary: This article argues that the fact that the 2021 global tax deal (focusing on Pillar 2) is cooperative is not in itself proof of the deal being beneficial (and certainly not equally beneficial) for all parties. Developing countries particularly may benefit less and possibly even lose from the agreement. The article focuses on two features of cooperation that may tilt the playing field in favour of developed countries: agenda influence and structural incentives to cooperate. Since the OECD had control over both the agenda and the ways in which the game was structured, it is not surprising that the deal served the interests of its members.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Recursos electrónicos | IEF | IEF | OP 2141/2023/10-2 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 2141/2023/10-2 |
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| No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | ||
| OP 2141/2023/1 Intertax | OP 2141/2023/10 Intertax | OP 2141/2023/10-1 The costs of Pillar 2 | OP 2141/2023/10-2 GLoBE | OP 2141/2023/10-3 UN MTC Article 14 | OP 2141/2023/10-4 A review of India approaches to cooperative compliance in light of the international tax practice and the OECD framework | OP 2141/2023/10-5 Targeted measures against intra-group debt financing |
Resumen.
This article argues that the fact that the 2021 global tax deal (focusing on Pillar 2) is cooperative is not in itself proof of the deal being beneficial (and certainly not equally beneficial) for all parties. Developing countries particularly may benefit less and possibly even lose from the agreement. The article focuses on two features of cooperation that may tilt the playing field in favour of developed countries: agenda influence and structural incentives to cooperate. Since the OECD had control over both the agenda and the ways in which the game was structured, it is not surprising that the deal served the interests of its members.
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