On the governance of carbon dioxide removal a public economics perspective Ottmar Edenhofer, Max Franks, Matthias Kalkuhl and Artur Runge-Metzger
Contributor(s): Edenhofer, Ottmar
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Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 207/2024/1-3 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 207/2024/1-3 |
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Resumen.
Bibliografía.
Climate policy increasingly requires carbon dioxide removal (CDR). We describe its role, characterize optimal flows for non-permanent removals and describe optimal pricing regimes under different information and liability conditions. Non-permanent removal – though to a certain extent optimal – creates liabilities that warrant careful risk management. Thus, seemingly cheap land-based technologies can become expensive. We discuss possibilities for integrating CDR in the EU policy architecture and define four tasks: managing the emission cap; R&D support; quality certification of removals; management of liabilities from non-permanent CDR. We propose three institutions for these tasks: a European Carbon Central Bank, a Carbon Removal Certification Authority and a Green Leap Innovation Authority.
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