Corporate tax breaks and executive compensation by Eric Ohrn
By: Ohrn, Eric
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Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 2135/2023/3-5 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 2135/2023/3-5 |
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OP 2135/2023/3-2 Common practice | OP 2135/2023/3-3 Spending responses to high-frequency shifts in payment timing | OP 2135/2023/3-4 How Social Security reform affects retirement and pension claiming | OP 2135/2023/3-5 Corporate tax breaks and executive compensation | OP 2135/2023/4 American Economic Journal : Economic Policy | OP 2135/2023/4-1 Public pension reforms and retirement decisions | OP 2135/2023/4-2 Do tax incentives increase firm innovation? |
Resumen.
Bibliografía.
I analyze the effect of two corporate tax breaks, bonus depreciation and the Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD), on executive compensation in publicly traded US firms. I find both tax breaks significantly increase executive compensation. For every dollar a firm benefits from the tax breaks, compensation of the firm's top five highest-paid executives increases by $0.17 to $0.25. The tax breaks increase compensation primarily in firms with weaker governance structures, suggesting the compensation response is driven by executive rent extraction.
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