What difference does a health plan make? evidence from random plan assignment in Medicaid Michael Geruso, Timothy J. Layton and Jacob Wallace
By: Geruso, Michael
.
Contributor(s): Layton, Timothy J | Wallace, Jacob.
Material type: 
ArticleSubject(s): ASISTENCIA SANITARIA | POLITICA SANITARIA | GASTOS SANITARIOS | ESTADOS UNIDOS | MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
In:
American Economic Journal : Applied Economics v.15, n. 3, July 2023, p. 341-379Summary: Exploiting the random assignment of Medicaid beneficiaries to managed care plans, we find substantial plan-specific spending effects despite plans having identical cost sharing. Enrollment in the lowest-spending plan reduces spending by at least 25 percent—primarily through quantity reductions—relative to enrollment in the highest-spending plan. Rather than reducing "wasteful" spending, lower-spending plans broadly reduce medical service provision—including the provision of low-cost, high-value care—and worsen beneficiary satisfaction and health. Consumer demand follows spending: a 10 percent increase in plan-specific spending is associated with a 40 percent increase in market share. These facts have implications for the government's contracting problem and program cost growth.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 2134/2023/3-2 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 2134/2023/3-2 |
Browsing IEF Shelves Close shelf browser
| No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | ||
| OP 2134/2023/2-1 Tax refund uncertainty | OP 2134/2023/3 American Economic Journal : Applied Economics | OP 2134/2023/3-1 Adverse selection in low-income health insurance markets | OP 2134/2023/3-2 What difference does a health plan make? | OP 2134/2023/4 American Economic Journal : Applied Economics | OP 2134/2024/1 American Economic Journal : Applied Economics | OP 2134/2024/2 American Economic Journal : Applied Economics |
Resumen.
Bibliografía.
Exploiting the random assignment of Medicaid beneficiaries to managed care plans, we find substantial plan-specific spending effects despite plans having identical cost sharing. Enrollment in the lowest-spending plan reduces spending by at least 25 percent—primarily through quantity reductions—relative to enrollment in the highest-spending plan. Rather than reducing "wasteful" spending, lower-spending plans broadly reduce medical service provision—including the provision of low-cost, high-value care—and worsen beneficiary satisfaction and health. Consumer demand follows spending: a 10 percent increase in plan-specific spending is associated with a 40 percent increase in market share. These facts have implications for the government's contracting problem and program cost growth.
There are no comments for this item.