Taxing billionaires estate taxes and the geographical location of the ultra-wealthy by Enrico Moretti and Daniel J. Wilson
By: Moretti, Enrico
.
Contributor(s): Wilson, Daniel J
.
Material type: 






Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 2135/2023/2-3 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 2135/2023/2-3 |
Browsing IEF Shelves Close shelf browser
No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | ||
OP 2135/2023/2 American Economic Journal : Economic Policy | OP 2135/2023/2-1 Optimal income taxation with spillovers from employer learning | OP 2135/2023/2-2 Pensions and fertility | OP 2135/2023/2-3 Taxing billionaires | OP 2135/2023/2-4 Externalities in international tax enforcement | OP 2135/2023/3 American Economic Journal : Economic Policy | OP 2135/2023/3-1 Sin taxes and self-control |
Resumen.
Bibliografía.
We contribute to the literature on the effect of taxes on the locational choices of wealthy individuals by examining the geographical sensitivity of the Forbes 400 richest Americans to state estate taxes. Though we find billionaires' effective tax rates are only about half the statutory rate, their residential choices are highly sensitive to these taxes, as 35 percent of local billionaires leave states with an estate tax. This tax-induced mobility causes a large reduction in the aggregate tax base. Nonetheless, we find that the revenue benefit of an estate tax exceeds the cost for the vast majority of states.
There are no comments for this item.