The efficiency costs of dividend taxation with managerial firms Marko Koethenbuerger, Michael E Stimmelmayr
By: Köthenbürger, Marko
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Contributor(s): Stimmelmayr, Michael.
Material type: 
ArticleSubject(s): SOCIEDADES | EMPRESAS | DIVIDENDOS | IMPUESTOS | IMPOSICION OPTIMA | MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
In:
The Economic Journal v. 132, n. 643, April 2022, p. 1123-1149Summary: The paper provides a positive and efficiency analysis of dividend taxation in a corporate agency model with a costly managerial effort. Unlike existing (agency) models, this model is consistent with empirical work in corporate finance and able to predict empirically observed investment responses to dividend taxation. In addition, we show that investment changes are not sufficient to infer, first, the efficiency cost of dividend taxation and, second, the financing regime underlying firms’ investments. We provide a testable implication that allows to empirically uncover the source of investment finance by comparing investment responses to dividend taxes and managerial incentive pay.
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| Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 282/2022/643-1 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 282/2022/643-1 |
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Resumen.
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The paper provides a positive and efficiency analysis of dividend taxation in a corporate agency model with a costly managerial effort. Unlike existing (agency) models, this model is consistent with empirical work in corporate finance and able to predict empirically observed investment responses to dividend taxation. In addition, we show that investment changes are not sufficient to infer, first, the efficiency cost of dividend taxation and, second, the financing regime underlying firms’ investments. We provide a testable implication that allows to empirically uncover the source of investment finance by comparing investment responses to dividend taxes and managerial incentive pay.
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