The politics of pain Medicaid expansion, the ACA and the opioid epidemic Michael E. Shepherd
By: Shepherd, Michael E
.
Material type: 
ArticleSubject(s): ASISTENCIA SANITARIA | POLITICA SANITARIA | ESTUPEFACIENTES | VOTO | ESTADOS UNIDOS
In:
Journal of Public Policy v. 42, issue 3, September 2022, p. 409-435Summary: Federalism allows state politicians opportunities to undermine or support for federal policies. As a result, voters often have varied impressions of the same federal programmes. To test how this dynamic affects voting behaviour, I gather data on the severity of the opioid epidemic from 2006–2016. I exploit discontinuities between states that expanded Medicaid and those that did not to gain causal leverage over whether expansion affected the severity of the epidemic and whether these policy effects affected policy feedback. I show that the decision to expand Medicaid reduced the severity of the opioid epidemic. I also show that expanding Medicaid and subsequent reductions in the severity of the opioid epidemic increased support for the Democratic Party. The results imply that the Republican Party performed better in places where voters did not have access to Medicaid expansion and where the epidemic worsened, demonstrating an unintended consequence of federalism on policy feedback.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 1793/2022/3-1 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 1793/2022/3-1 |
Browsing IEF Shelves Close shelf browser
| No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | No cover image available | ||
| OP 1793/2022/2-1 Direct democracy, coalition size and public spending | OP 1793/2022/2-2 Never let a serious crisis go to waste | OP 1793/2022/3 Journal of Public Policy | OP 1793/2022/3-1 The politics of pain | OP 1793/2022/4 Journal of Public Policy | OP 1793/2022/4-1 Fiscal policy preferences, trade-offs, and support for social investment | OP 1793/2022/4-2 Accountability and corruption displacement |
Resumen.
Bibliografía.
Federalism allows state politicians opportunities to undermine or support for federal policies. As a result, voters often have varied impressions of the same federal programmes. To test how this dynamic affects voting behaviour, I gather data on the severity of the opioid epidemic from 2006–2016. I exploit discontinuities between states that expanded Medicaid and those that did not to gain causal leverage over whether expansion affected the severity of the epidemic and whether these policy effects affected policy feedback. I show that the decision to expand Medicaid reduced the severity of the opioid epidemic. I also show that expanding Medicaid and subsequent reductions in the severity of the opioid epidemic increased support for the Democratic Party. The results imply that the Republican Party performed better in places where voters did not have access to Medicaid expansion and where the epidemic worsened, demonstrating an unintended consequence of federalism on policy feedback.
Click on an image to view it in the image viewer
There are no comments for this item.