Fake news, voter overconfidence, and the quality of democratic choice by Melis Kartal and Jean-Robert Tyran
By: Kartal, Melis
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Contributor(s): Tyran, Jean Robert.
Material type: 
ArticleSubject(s): DEMOCRACIA | MEDIOS DE COMUNICACION SOCIAL | INFORMACION | OPINION PUBLICA | NOTICIAS FALSAS | VOTO | MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
In:
The American Economic Review v. 112, n. 10, October 2022, p. 3367-3397Summary: This paper studies, theoretically and experimentally, the effects of overconfidence and fake news on information aggregation and the quality of democratic choice in a common-interest setting. We theoretically show that overconfidence exacerbates the adverse effects of widespread misinformation (i.e., fake news). We then analyze richer models that allow for partisanship, targeted misinformation intended to sway public opinion, and news signals correlated across voters (due to media ownership concentration or censorship). In our experiment, overconfidence severely undermines information aggregation, suggesting that the effect of overconfidence can be much more pronounced at the collective than at the individual level.
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| OP 234/2022/1 The American Economic Review | OP 234/2022/10 The American Economic Review | OP 234/2022/10-1 Demagogues and the economic fragility of democracies | OP 234/2022/10-2 Fake news, voter overconfidence, and the quality of democratic choice | OP 234/2022/1-1 Employment structure and the rise of the modern tax system | OP 234/2022/11 The American Economic Review | OP 234/2022/12 The American Economic Review |
Resumen.
Bibliografía.
This paper studies, theoretically and experimentally, the effects of overconfidence and fake news on information aggregation and the quality of democratic choice in a common-interest setting. We theoretically show that overconfidence exacerbates the adverse effects of widespread misinformation (i.e., fake news). We then analyze richer models that allow for partisanship, targeted misinformation intended to sway public opinion, and news signals correlated across voters (due to media ownership concentration or censorship). In our experiment, overconfidence severely undermines information aggregation, suggesting that the effect of overconfidence can be much more pronounced at the collective than at the individual level.
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