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Who does and doesn't pay taxes? electrónico Arun Advani

By: Advani, Arun.
Material type: ArticleArticleSubject(s): CUMPLIMIENTO FISCAL | CONTRIBUYENTES | CONDUCTA | FRAUDE FISCAL | ELUSION FISCAL | EVASION FISCAL | REINO UNIDO In: Fiscal Studies v. 43, Issue 1, March 2022, p. 5-22Summary: We use administrative tax data from audits of self-assessment tax returns to understand what types individuals are most likely to be non-compliant. Non-compliance is common, with one-third of taxpayers underpaying by some amount, although half of aggregate under-reporting is done by just 2 per cent of taxpayers. Third-party reporting reduces non-compliance, while working in a cash-prevalent industry increases it. However, compliance also varies significantly with individual characteristics: non-compliance is higher for men and younger people. These results matter for measuring inequality, for understanding taxpayer behaviour, and for targeting audit resources.
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Disponible en formato electrónico en el Repositorio de la Biblioteca del IEF.

We use administrative tax data from audits of self-assessment tax returns to understand what types individuals are most likely to be non-compliant. Non-compliance is common, with one-third of taxpayers underpaying by some amount, although half of aggregate under-reporting is done by just 2 per cent of taxpayers. Third-party reporting reduces non-compliance, while working in a cash-prevalent industry increases it. However, compliance also varies significantly with individual characteristics: non-compliance is higher for men and younger people. These results matter for measuring inequality, for understanding taxpayer behaviour, and for targeting audit resources.

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