Dynamic capital tax competition under the source principle by Till Gross, Paul Klein and Miltiadis Makris
By: Gross, Till
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Contributor(s): Klein, Paul | Makris, Miltiadis.
Material type: 
ArticleSubject(s): CAPITAL | RENDIMIENTOS DE CAPITAL | IMPUESTOS | COMPETENCIA FISCAL NOCIVA | MOVIMIENTO DE CAPITALES | EROSIÓN DE LA BASE IMPONIBLE Y TRASLADO DE BENEFICIOS | MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
In:
American Economic Journal : Macroeconomics v. 14, n. 3, July 2022, p. 365-410Summary: We explore the short- and long-run implications of tax competition between jurisdictions, where governments can only tax capital at source. We do this in the context of a neoclassical growth model under commitment and capital mobility. We provide a new theoretical perspective on the dynamic capital tax externalities that emerge in this model. Numerically, we show that the net capital tax externality is positive in the short run but converges to zero in the long run. We also find that noncooperative source-based capital taxes are initially positive and slowly decline toward zero.
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| OP 2137/2022/2-1 High marginal tax rates on the top 1 percent? | OP 2137/2022/3 American Economic Journal : Macroeconomics | OP 2137/2022/3-1 Optimal taxation with endogenous default under incomplete markets | OP 2137/2022/3-2 Dynamic capital tax competition under the source principle | OP 2137/2022/4 American Economic Journal : Macroeconomics | OP 2137/2022/4-1 Expectations-driven liquidity traps | OP 2137/2022/4-2 Fiscal rules and the sovereign default premium |
Resumen.
Bibliografía.
We explore the short- and long-run implications of tax competition between jurisdictions, where governments can only tax capital at source. We do this in the context of a neoclassical growth model under commitment and capital mobility. We provide a new theoretical perspective on the dynamic capital tax externalities that emerge in this model. Numerically, we show that the net capital tax externality is positive in the short run but converges to zero in the long run. We also find that noncooperative source-based capital taxes are initially positive and slowly decline toward zero.
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