Employer incentives and distortions in health insurance design implications for welfare and costs Nicholas Tilipman
By: Tilipman, Nicholas
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ArticleSubject(s): SEGUROS DE SALUD | TRABAJADORES | INCENTIVOS | GASTOS SANITARIOS | ESTADOS UNIDOS
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The American Economic Review v. 112, n. 3, March 2022, p. 998-1037Summary: This paper studies employer incentives in designing health insurance provider networks and whether observed offerings reflect preferences that are aligned with employees. I estimate a model of supply and demand where I endogenize employer health plan offerings with respect to hospital and physician networks. I find that employers "overprovide" broad networks by overweighting the preferences of certain employees, specifically older workers and those in regions with less provider competition, over the preferences of the average employee household. Shifting employers toward offering different provider networks in different geographic markets could yield substantial gains to surplus, with minimal distributional or selection effects.
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| OP 234/2022/2 The American Economic Review | OP 234/2022/2-1 Taxes and turnout | OP 234/2022/3 The American Economic Review | OP 234/2022/3-1 Employer incentives and distortions in health insurance design | OP 234/2022/4 The American Economic Review | OP 234/2022/4-1 Understanding the scarring effect of recessions | OP 234/2022/5 The American Economic Review |
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This paper studies employer incentives in designing health insurance provider networks and whether observed offerings reflect preferences that are aligned with employees. I estimate a model of supply and demand where I endogenize employer health plan offerings with respect to hospital and physician networks. I find that employers "overprovide" broad networks by overweighting the preferences of certain employees, specifically older workers and those in regions with less provider competition, over the preferences of the average employee household. Shifting employers toward offering different provider networks in different geographic markets could yield substantial gains to surplus, with minimal distributional or selection effects.
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